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ARGUMENT
In its Cross-Appeal, Continental Bank relies on the
following theories.

Only the first two are treated in this reply

brief as the third theory was not discussed by defendants in their
reply brief:
1.

Defendants are Liable on the Signed Guarantees.
The guarantees executed by defendants are valid
even though some limited partners may not have
executed guarantees. The guarantee is not
conditioned on all limited partners being
guarantors and the failure of some to execute
guarantees does not affect the liability of
those limited partners who signed.

2.

Defendants Contracted to Execute Guarantee
Agreements. The evidence clearly shows that
defendants intended and agreed to guarantee
payment of the debt to Continental Bank and that
they treated themselves as guarantors.
Defendants are therefore bound by the terms of
the written guarantees.

3.

Third Party Beneficiary Contract. In Section
7.5 of the Partnership Agreement, defendants
promised to (1) make additional capital
contributions for the purchase of the press, and
(2) guarantee the debt Color Craft incurred in
acquiring the press. The trial court found that
Continental Bank was a third party beneficiary
of defendants' promise in Section 7.5 to make
additional capital contributions. Continental
Bank therefore necessarily is a third party
beneficiary of defendants1 promise in Section
7.5 to guarantee the debt Color Craft incurred
in acquiring the press. (Respondent's Opening
Brief, Section IX.)
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I.

THE SIGNED GUARANTEES ARE ENFORCEABLE EVEN THOUGH SOME
GUARANTORS MAY NOT HAVE EXECUTED GUARANTEES.
Citing State Bank of East Moline v. Cirivello, 386

N.E.2d 43 (111. 1978), defendants contend that even the
defendants who signed guarantees are relieved of liability on
those guarantees because other limited partners did not execute
guarantees.

The Cirivello holding is a narrow one, however, and

does not extend to the facts of this case.
A.

The Guarantees Were Not Conditioned on All Limited
Partners Executing Guarantees.

The holding in Cirivello was premised upon a factual
determination that the creditor bank had agreed on a number of
occasions that the loan the limited partners were guaranteeing
"would not be advanced without the personal guarantees of all the
limited partners . . . [and] that the guarantees would not become
effective unless all thirteen [limited partners] signed."
44, 47.

Id. at

In reliance on that agreement, 12 of the 13 limited

partners executed guarantees.

Despite this contractual

condition, however, the bank advanced-the loan before receiving
the guarantee of the thirteenth limited partner.

Id,, at 45.

Finding that the bank had not satisfied a contractual condition
precedent, the court relieved the twelve limited partners of
liability.
Here, neither the advancement of the loan nor the
enforceability of the guarantees was conditioned on all of the
limited partners signing guarantees.
-2-

In fact, the loan was

disbursed to Color Craft before Color Craft ever submitted the
guarantees to the defendants for execution.

(Exhibit 53 [Tab 8

to Respondents Opening Brief], Transcript, p. 403). Therefore,
unlike Cirivello, the advancement of funds was not conditioned on
the receipt of guarantees from each limited partner.
There was a loan condition that all limited partners
would be guarantors but, quite simply, it was not a condition
precedent as the loan was disbursed without any of the limited
partner guarantees being executed.

And each of the defendants

knew as much as they received their guaranty forms for execution
after the loan closed.

Moreover, the asserted condition is

contrary to the express language of the guarantees, which state
that they are "continuing, absolute and unconditional"; and which
contain a waiver of notice as to whether any other guarantee
would be obtained.

(Exhibit 46 [Appellant's Brief Tab 18]). In

this case, the requirement that guarantees be executed by each
limited partner was not a condition precedent to enforceability
of the guarantees, but was rather "an additional obligation under
the agreement which ran in favor of [the bank] and in no way
affected [the signing guarantors] risk."

Lawndale Steel Co. v.

Appel, 423 N.E.2d 957, 961 (111. Ct. App. 1981).
B.

Liability of the Defendants Who Signed Guarantees
Was Not Affected by the Failure of Other Defendants
to Execute Guarantees.

Cirivello is also distinguishable because its holding
was premised on the finding that the bank's failure to obtain
-3-

guarantees from all of the limited partners "materially increased
the proportionate liability of those who had signed."
386 N.E.2d at 446-447.

Cirivello,

In Cirivello, although the guarantees

provided for joint and several liability, the bank represented
that each limited partner would be liable only for one-thirteenth
of the loan obligation.

As a result, when twelve limited

partners signed instead of thirteen, each limited partner's
liability was increased from one-thirteenth to one-twelfth of the
partnership debt.
Here, however, each signing defendant's liability
remained the same whether he was the only person to execute a
guarantee or whether all of the limited partners executed
guarantees.

Pursuant to the guarantees, each defendant's

liability was limited to 150% of his prorata share of the debt,
and the prorata shares of each limited partner were specified in
the guarantee at the time they were executed.

For example, the

guarantee of Robert J. and Sue A. Allen, attached to Appellate's
Brief as tab 22, provides as follows:

. . . the obligations for which the undersigned
herein guaranteed shall be limited to and shall
not exceed one hundred fifty percent 150% of the
undersigned's prorata share as a limited partner
of Color Craft Press, Ltd. of the indebtedness
of the amount of Exhibit "A". The Undersigned's
prorata share is 3.58%. (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, regardless of how many limited partners executed
guarantees, Continental Bank could look to the Aliens for 150% of
-4-

3,58% of Color Craft's indebtedness.

Similarly, each of the other

defendants' prorata shares were specified in their guarantee
depending on how many units of Color Craft each defendant owned.
The bank was not required to look to every limited partner for
equal contribution, but instead could recover from any limited
partner 150% of that limited partner's prorata share of Color
Craft's obligation.

As a result, each limited partner was

obligated to Continental Bank for the full amount specified in the
guarantee regardless of how many limited partners signed the
guarantee.
In summary, the guarantees defendants signed were not
conditioned on the execution of a guarantee by every limited
partner and the liability of each limited partner did not change
depending on how many limited partners executed guarantees.
Therefore, this case falls squarely within the confines of Appel,
discussed fully in Section VILA, of Continental Bank's Opening
Brief at pages 22-29, and the defendants who signed guarantees
cannot avoid the liability they intended to undertake when they
signed those guarantees.

^-It is for this reason that the example on pages 11-12 of
Defendants' Reply Brief is inaccurate. That example incorrectly
assumes that Continental Bank is required to pursue equal
contribution from all limited partners. That assumption is
contrary to the percentage of the prorata share — 150% —
specified in the guarantees. That 150% figure is significant
because it shows that defendants were aware at the time the
guarantees were signed that the defendants may not be required to
contribute to the Color Craft debt in proportional shares.
-5-

C.

Mount Prospect Does Not Stand for the Proposition
For Which It Is Cited.

Defendants contend that Mount Prospect State Bank v.
Forestry Recycling, 417 N.E.2d 621 (111. Ct. App. 1981) extends
the Cirivello holding to the facts of this case.

It does not. In

fact, the Court in Mount Prospect merely remanded back to the
trial court for a factual determination as to whether the first
"requirement" of Cirivello - that the guarantees and loan
advancement be conditioned on all of the limited partners
executing guarantees - was satisfied.
In Mount Prospect, the trial court granted the creditor
bank's motion for summary judgment against limited partners
despite a factual dispute between the bank and the limited
partners as to whether there was a condition precedent that all
limited partners would become co-guarantors.

Goldstein, the

general partner, testified that the "bank had represented to him
that it would not open the loan until all of the 25 limited
partnership units were purchased and the purchasers had each
provided personal guarantees."

id. at 626.

The bank, on the

other hand, alleged that it had never represented to anyone that
it was a condition precedent to making the loan that all of the
limited partners execute guarantees.

There was also a factual

dispute as to whether the bank had opened the loan without
receiving a guarantee from each limited partner.
After discussing the holding in Cirivello, the court
found:
-6-

[a] genuine issue of material fact . . . as to
whether a condition to the contracts of
guarantee was that all of the limited partners
become co-guarantors . . . [and] a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether this condition
was met.
Id. at 629.

The court therefore remanded the case back to the tri

al court.
The appellate court in Mount Prospect did not extend
Cirivello, it simply sent the matter back to the trial court for
a determination as to whether the "first" requirement of
Cirivello was satisfied.

Because there was a genuine factual

dispute as to whether that requirement was met and as to whether
all the limited partners had executed guarantees, the Mount
Prospect court did not even reach the issue of whether any
missing guarantee "materially increased" the other limited
partners obligations on the guarantee.

Mount Prospect simply did

not reach the proposition for which it has been cited.

II.

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT BAR THE LIABILITY OF ANY
OF THE DEFENDANTS.
A.

Sufficient Written Memoranda Exist to Satisfy the
Statute.

Defendants' claim that the statute of frauds precludes
liability of the non-signing defendants.

The requirements of that

statute have been fully met, however as written memoranda do exist
which set forth the essential terms of defendants' agreement to
guarantee Color Craft's debt to R&P.

-7-

Such written memoranda are

signed by defendants1 agent and satisfy the requirements of Utah
Code Ann. § 25-5-4.
Amendment No. 4, to Certificate of Limited Partners of
Color Craft Press, Ltd., Exhibit 80, provides:
[t]he Class B Limited Partners have agreed
to personally guarantee repayment of indebtedness
incurred by the Partnership to acquire such
printing press and associated equipment;
provided, however, the maximum amount guaranteed
by any Class B Limited Partner shall not exceed
150 percent of such Limited Partners* pro rata
share of the total indebtedness with Roberts and
Porter, Inc.
Amendment No. 4 at 1f 7 (emphasis added).

William G. O'Mara

acting as attorney-in-fact on behalf of each of the limited
partners executed this amendment.
Amendment No. 5 to Certificate of Limited Partnership of
Color Craft Press, Ltd., Exhibit 91, contains the same provision
concerning the limited partners* guaranty agreements.

A. V.

Moxley, acting as attorney-in-fact for the limited partners,
executed this amendment.
Taken together, these documents satisfy the statute of
frauds as the quoted paragraph which appears in both Amendments 4
and 5 identifies the parties to the guaranty agreements: the
limited partners of Color Craft; specifies the consideration
underlying the original obligation and the consideration for the
guarantees: the sale of the printing equipment to Color Craft and
the financing of the sale; and recites the essential terms of the

-8-

guaranties.

See, e.g., Hoffman v. S.V. Co., Inc., 628 P.2d 218

(Idaho 1981).
Although neither Amendment No. 4 nor Amendment No. 5
specify the amount of indebtedness owing to Continental Bank, to
the extent necessary, the partnership agreements (Exhibits 79 and
90) can be read in conjunction with the Amendments and flesh out
the relative interests of the partners in the partnership.

These

documents, when read together, identify each limited
partner/guarantor's obligations with such particularity that it
cannot be confused with or claimed to apply to any other debt.
Matter of Estate of Bonny, 600 P.2d 548, 549 (Utah 1979).
When more than one writing is used to satisfy the
requirements of the statute of frauds, some nexus between the
writings must be established.

"This requirement may be satisfied

. . . by implied reference gleaned from the contents of the
writings and the circumstances surrounding the transaction . . .
[P]arol evidence may be used to connect an unsigned document to
one that has been signed by the person to be charged."
v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369, 372 (Utah 1980).

Greqerson

Here the Amendments and

the partnership agreement adequately define each defendants'
obligation to guarantee repayment of a portion of Color Craft's
indebtedness to R&P and the relative ownership interests of the
defendants.

The nexus between these documents is clear as the

Amendments are statutory certificates which evidence the existence
of the partnership created by the partnership agreement.
-9-

With

that established, reading them as a unit is entirely appropriate.
Thus, there is. a writing within the meaning of the Statute of
Frauds that establishes defendants' agreements with sufficient
detail that the Statute of Frauds will not bar imposition of
liability against all of the defendants.
B.

Continental Bank Has Fully Performed Its Obligations
to Finance The Purchase of the Press, Thus The
Statute of Frauds Is Inapplicable.

Relying upon defendants' promises to guarantee Color
Craft's debt to Continental Bank and Cullimore's assurances that
the guaranties would be obtained, Continental Bank provided
financing to the partnership for the purchase of Press B.

Because

Continental Bank has fully performed its agreement to provide
Color Craft with financing.

That performance takes the guarantee

agreements outside the statute of frauds and allows the agreements
to be enforced.

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides:

A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forebearance on the
part of the promisee or a third person and which
does induce the action or forebearance is
enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement
of the promise.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 139(1)(1981).

-10-

III.

THE GUARANTEES WERE VALIDLY ASSIGNED AND ARE ENFORCEABLE
AGAINST DEFENDANTS,
A.

The Guarantees were Validly Assigned by R&P to
Continental Bank.

Defendants contend that although R&P assigned to
Continental Bank all of its rights in the purchase contracts,
promissory notes and security agreements executed by Color Craft,
the guarantees defendants subsequently executed to secure
performance of the purchase contract were not assigned to
Continental Bank.

It is clear, however, that the "transfer of

the underlying principal obligation operates as an assignment of
the guarantee." Schroeder v. Hunter-Douglas, Inc., 324 S.E.2d
746, 749 (Ga.

Ct. App. 1985). The underlying debt simply

"carries with it" any method of securing that debt, even if that
method is not specifically included in the assignment.

See

National Market Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 P. 1009, 1010
(Wash. 1918).

As a result, R&P's assignment of the underlying

obligation effectively transferred to Continental Bank all of
R&P's remedies available to collect the obligations owed,
including enforcement of the defendants' individual guarantees.
B.

The Assignment Did Not Render Defendants'
Guarantees Unenforceable.

Defendants contend that even if effectively assigned,
the guarantees are unenforceable because (1) the guarantees did
not exist at the time of the assignment; (2) guarantees are
generally not assignable; and (3) the assignment materially
altered defendants' liability as guarantors.
are valid.
-11-

None of such claims

1.

The guarantees executed after the assignment of the
purchase contract were validly assigned.

Defendants' guarantees were validly assignable even
though they were not executed until after Continental Bank was
assigned the purchase contract and promissory notes. First,
guarantees are simply a means of securing an underlying
obligation (the purchase contract which defendants concede was
validly assigned) and as such are "carried with" the assignment
of that obligation.

Moreover, although "things not in existence"

were not assignable at common law, such assignments are valid in
equity. . ."
2.

See 6A C.J.S., "Assignments," § 14, pp. 605-606.
Guarantees are assignable under Illinois law.

Although defendants suggest that "[u]nder Illinois law
guarantees are generally not assignable at all (Reply Brief of
Appellants, p. 24), the cases upon which they rely expressly hold
that guarantees are assignable unless "the essentials of the
original contract have been changed and the performance of the
principal is materially different from that first contemplated."
See Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Stephens, 422 N.E.2d, 1136,
1139 (111. Ct. App. 1981); Schranz v. I. L. Grossman, Inc., 412
N.E.2d 1378, 1384-85 (111. Ct. App. 1980).

As shown below, the

assignment by R&P to Continental Bank did not materially increase
defendants1 obligations under the guarantees and, in fact, the
assignment was made in accordance with the provisions of the
purchase contract and the guarantees.

-12-

3.

The Assignment Did Not Affect Defendants
Obligations Under the Guarantees,

Citing Harris Trust, defendants contend that the
assignment of the purchase contract was ineffective because it
materially changed defendants* obligations under the guarantees
in that a provision in the purchase contract prevented defendants
from asserting defenses it may have against R&P in any action
brought by an assignee of R&P.
illogical.

Defendants' argument is

The alteration of a guarantor's liability results in

unenforceability of a guarantee only if (1) there is a material
alteration in the principal contract, (2) after the execution of
the guarantee contract, and (3) the alteration was made without
the guarantor's consent.

See Appel, 423 N.E.2d at 963.

If those

three conditions are met, a novation occurs and a new principal
contract is deemed to exist to which the guarantor is not bound.
In this case, however, defendants have not and cannot establish
any of the three necessary requirements.
First, the assignment did not result in any alteration
of the principal obligation (the purchase contract).

In fact,

the alleged alteration is contained in the purchase contract
which the defendants stipulated that they intended to guaranty.
They agreed to the terms of the already existing purchase
contract when they executed their guarantees and they cannot now
contend that an assignment pursuant to an express provision in
the purchase contract materially altered their obligations as
guarantors.
-13-

In addition, the assignment to Continental Bank occurred
before the guarantees were submitted by Color Craft to defendants
for execution.

As a result, at the time they executed the

guarantees the defendants knew, or are deemed to have known
through their general partner, the terms of the purchase
contract, that R&P was not the financier of the purchase, and
that the underlying obligations of Color Craft to R&P had been
assigned to Continental Bank.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, defendants
consented to the assignment when they executed the guarantees.
Paragraph 5 of the guarantees provides as follows:
Seller [R&P] may, from time to time, without
notice to guarantor, assign or transfer the
[purchase] contract and any or all of the
"equipment" therein described; and, notwithstanding any such assignment or transfer or any
subsequent assignment or transfer thereof, the
liabilities represented thereby shall be and
remain liabilities for the purposes of this
guarantee, and each and every immediate and
successive assignee or transferee of any of the
liabilities or of any interest therein shall, to
the extent of the interest of such assignee or
transferee as if such assignee or transferee
were seller. . .
It is well established that "a guarantor is not released by a
change in the underlying contract where it is made in accordance
with a provision of the guarantee." Florentine Corporation, Inc.
v. Pepa I, Inc. 339 S.E.2d 112, 114 (S.C. 1985) (citing 38 C.J.S.
"Guarantee," Section 73 (1943)); see also Security National Bank
v. Sloane, 648 P.2d 861, 864 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).

-14-

Therefore, the

assignment pursuant to paragraph 5 of the guarantee does not
render the guarantee ineffective.

IV.

THE COURT SHOULD REFORM THE GUARANTEE AGREEMENTS.
Defendants misunderstand what action is sought by

Continental Bank in its request that the court reform the
guarantee agreements.

What the bank seeks is an Order changing

the name of the party whose debt is guaranteed from the name of
the guarantor to Color Craft Press, Ltd.
Each of the guarantee agreements contains, in the second
full paragraph, the following:
Seller and
, an individual
("Buyer"), propose to execute and deliver
Equipment Contract Purchase Agreement dated
providing for the purchase by
Seller to Buyer of Printing Machinery described
in Exhibit "A" therein described and attached.
(Ex 46 [Appellant's Opening Brief Tab 18]).
As stipulated in the pretrial order, Cullimore inserted
the name of the guarantors in the first blank and the date of the
execution of the Equipment Purchase Agreement in the second
blank.

Instead, he should have inserted in the first blank the

name of Color Craft Press, Ltd., the limited partnership, which
was the purchaser under the equipment contract.
The facts with respect to this issue are uncontroverted.
The Guarantee Agreement was filled in by Cullimore and that he
made the mistake of inserting the guarantors name in the blank
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where he should have inserted the name of Color Craft Press, Ltd.
(Pretrial Order 1f 5(d)(18)(20)).

Cullimore understood that the

purchaser of the press would be the partnership and that it was
the partnership obligation which needed to be guarantied.
(Pretrial Order If 5(d)(21)).

McMillin testified that Cullimore

retyped the guarantees, modifying a form submitted by him from
Continental Bank.

(Transcript, p. 366). As well, Cullimore

testified that he sent the guarantee agreements to the limited
partners with none of the blanks filled in and that he filled them
in upon their return by the signors.

(Transcript, pp. 253-254.)

Each of the defendants who returned agreements to Cullimore in
blank understood that he or Color Craft would fill in the blanks.
(Pretrial Order, If 5(d)(19)).
correctly.

He thought they were prepared

(Pretrial Order, M 5(d)(24)).

From the foregoing uncontroverted facts it is clear that
in filling in the blanks in the guarantee agreements Cullimore
erred, thus creating much of the confusion which has existed in
this case.

Quite simply, Continental~Bank asks that the Court

reform the guarantee agreements to correct the error of Mr.
Cullimore.

There was never any doubt in his mind, nor is there a

reasonable basis for doubt in the minds of the limited partners,
based upon the stipulated facts, as to whose debt they were being
asked to guarantee.

They have stipulated they intended to

guarantee the debt of Color Craft for its purchase of the press.

-16-

Reforming the guarantee agreements to reflect that intent is
entirely appropriate.
The defendants claim that Continental Bank seeks, as
well, to have the guarantee agreements reformed to state the
amount of the indebtedness guarantied.

In fact, reformation as to

the amount of the indebtedness is not necessary as the amount is
clearly set forth in Exhibit A attached to the printing machinery
contract which is incorporated by reference in the guarantee
agreement.

The exhibits attached to that contract consist of a

number of pages which describe in detail the purchase terms for
the equipment contract.

Those exhibits were introduced at trial

as a separate exhibit, #41. Additionally, those exhibits were
attached to the Purchase Contract, Exhibit 42A.

(They are
2

attached to appellant's opening brief as Tab 13).
Harry McMillin testified without contradiction that those
documents constituted the exhibits to the purchase contract
(Transcript, P. 324) and that although the schedule of payments
was labeled Exhibit "D" to the Purchase Contract, such schedule
was the schedule evidencing how much was due to be paid.

Thus,

^Defendants have made much of their supposed lack of
knowledge of the amount they were being asked to guarantee. It is
interesting that the alleged condition precedent to the purchase
requiring the personal guarantee of each limited partner is
contained in the very document which also sets forth in detail the
purchase price for the equipment.
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contrary to the claim of defendants, Continental Bank does not
need to have the guarantee agreements reformed to state the amount
due, rather that amount is clearly referenced in the exhibits
attached to the purchase contract.

When the purchase contract,

guarantees and Exhibit 36 offering letter are viewed together as a
group, there can be no question as to the amount of the purchase
price and thus the amount guaranteed.

There is, therefore, no

need for reformation on this issue.

V.

BOTH CULLIMORE AND COLOR CRAFT ARE OBLIGATED ON THE
PROMISSORY NOTES.
Defendants are hard pressed to argue that the debt for

the purchase of the printing press was not a debt of Color
Craft.

The stipulated facts at trial were that "Color Craft and

R&P entered into a machinery contract" for the purchase of the
Nebiolo Press & Muller-Martini binder, that "each of the
documents executed by Color Craft evidencing the purchase of the
Nebiolo Press and Muller-Martini binder was executed on behalf of
Color Craft by William G. O'Mara, the president of Color Craft
Press, Inc., the managing general partner of Color Craft," and
that "Color Craft executed promissory notes and security
agreements by which it promised to pay the sums due to R & P on
the Nebiolo Press and Muller-Martini binder. . . . "

[Appellants

Opening Brief, tab 2, p. 9]. The fact that the promissory notes
were signed by Cullimore personally, as well as by Color Craft,
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via its President O'Mara, indicates that both Color Craft and
Cullimore are obligated for repayment of the indebtedness.

In

addition, Cullimore admits that he intended to be personally
liable for 100% of the indebtedness evidenced by the promissory
notes, (Transcript pp. 203, 208 and 248; Exhibit 36, p. 420121
[Respondents Brief, tab 5]) and he signed a separate guarantee as
to each promissory note.

Exhibits 43, 44, (Respondents Brief,

tab 6).
CONCLUSION
As set forth in Respondents* opening brief, this Court
should sustain the lower court's entry of judgment on the
third-party beneficiary contract to make additional capital
contributions and should remand the case to the trial court with
instructions to enter judgment against each defendants as a
guarantor of the indebtedness of Color Craft to Continental Bank.
DATED this

<-u

day of June, 1989.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Anthony \fJ. Schofield
Attorneys for Continental Illinois
National Bank & Trust Company
of Chicago
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